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Abstract 
 
In this paper European-Middle Eastern security relations are being investigated with 
particular reference to the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict. The study underlines the European Union’s important role in the Middle East 
in terms of economic cooperation and development assistance, but it also highlights 
the obstacles the European Union faces in reaching a unified position in the Middle 
East security discussion. The paper asks how and with what success the European 
Union has tried to promote regional security through the Euro-Mediterranean Partner-
ship, in particular in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It is argued that the European 
Union’s attempt to advance regional security through the Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership remains elusive and fragile. EU policy towards the Middle East Peace 
Process still depends largely on particular EU presidencies. The fact that the Middle 
East is so poorly organized as a region and tends to favor bilateral negotiations with 
the European Union and individual member states results in a divergent mixture of 
foreign policy relations and competing visions of the Middle East.  
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Introduction: Regional Security in the Middle East and the EU 
 
In recent deliberations about ‘regionalism’ and ‘regional cooperation’, the Middle 
East is often treated as an exception, as there is a lack of integrative schemes and 
mechanisms. Nevertheless, the recent decade has spurred discussion about why the 
conflict endures as the defining feature of the region. The decade has also seen 
intensified efforts by external actors to create an integrated ‘region’. Such efforts are 
found within European initiatives promoting interregional relations.  
This paper explores interregional relations between the European Union (EU) 
and the Middle East with a focus on conflict management and security. The 
intention is to analyze European-Middle East security relations as they have been 
articulated within the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) framework, which is 
seen as “the most important regional process that currently exists in the 
Mediterranean” (Calleya 2005: 1). Particular emphasis is placed on how the EU has 
approached the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians. The Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict is an intransigent issue of great concern to the EU, and yet the EU has been 
starkly absent from the issue as an actor in the arena of conflict management and 
has instead played an important role in other contexts. In addition, the paper has the 
broader goal to explicate the terms ‘security’ and ‘security cooperation’. The issue 
for exploration is thus: how and with what success has the EU tried to promote 
regional security through the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, in particular in the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict? 
The concern here is primarily on state-led or government-based interregional 
relations. Hänggi, Roloff and Rüland (2006: 3) define interregionalism as 
“institutionalized relations between world regions”. This definition implies that for 
interregional relations to exist, and for interregionalism to be a meaningful analytical 
term, regional institutions must have been formed; that is, some form of regionalism 
on behalf of the interacting regions must exist (ibid.: 6). EU-Middle East relations 
could, according to this perspective, only be truly successful if both regions are 
based on firm institutional soil. However, interregional relations need not be formally 
state-based; they may take other forms. Institutions are thus important, but not 
necessary conditions for interregionalism. 
Regionalism and interregional cooperation are seen as inextricably linked to 
globalization. In terms of security, globalization has triggered a diversification of 
threat perceptions, which, on the one hand, have created multilateral pressures to 
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cooperate and on the other, new modes of fighting and sources of conflict. Thus, 
security globalization involves the ways in which military networks and alliances 
expand and the ways in which security affairs of different regions interact and 
influence one another (Held et al. 1999). This has, in turn, altered the meaning and 
content of national security perceptions. Deterritorialization and diffusion of new 
actors mean that the state is being increasingly challenged as the sole security 
agent. The security agenda has widened with the inclusion of ‘soft security’ issues, 
which alters the relevance of national military power and increases the importance 
of multilateralism. Consequently, security is increasingly being sought through 
regional institutions (Buzan and Waever 2003). Deterritorialization (Held et al. 1999) 
obviously has a tremendous impact on security, and the regional level of security has 
become manifestly more important since the end of the Cold War (Buzan and 
Waever 2003: 11). Regional and interregional schemes of cooperation can thus be 
seen as responses to changes in threat perceptions and to altered ways of defining 
security. Different regional constellations can therefore be meaningfully analyzed as 
responses to security perceptions and images of threat.  
 
Lack of Regional Integration in the Middle East 
 
The Middle East is a region more frequently defined by its conflicts than by 
meaningful cooperation and remains only loosely integrated on an institutional basis 
(Aarts 1999; Guazzone 1997; Schulz, Söderbaum and Öjendal 2001). The flow of intra-
regional trade is low, common interests and needs are not framed into integrated 
policies, and institutions remain weak and tend to be arenas for competing state 
interests rather than vehicles for cooperation. There is a marked dearth of regional 
institutions and mechanisms for conflict resolution and confidence building (Brauch, 
Marquina and Biad 2000; Biscop 2003). As many observers have acknowledged, for 
a region exhibiting a history of prolonged conflict characterized by numerous 
internal as well as inter-state wars in the context of decolonization and the 
emergence of state building, conflict is inevitably a defining structure of the region. 
As Hinnebusch (2003: 154) described it: “War has profoundly shaped the Middle East 
regional system”. As a “regional security complex”, the Middle East is defined 
through complex patterns of security interdependence (Buzan and Waever 2003: 
187). Indeed, “the Middle Eastern RSC [regional security complex] was born fighting” 
(ibid.: 188). The dominance of security issues and the conflict patterns of the region 
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have also relegated interregional cooperative relations to lower importance (ibid.: 
200).  
The Arab League has historically been the prime vehicle for Arab integration 
in terms of cooperative initiatives. It was formed in 1945 as part of the regional order 
post-World War II, and has, as most observers have acknowledged, remained an 
ideological and discursive construction, with few initiatives relating to more material 
or institutional regional cooperation (Kerr 1997; Barnett 1998). The Arab League has 
served as the main institutional representative of the “Arab regional system” (Bilgin 
2005). Its main focus has been the question of Palestine, and its political energy has 
been directed towards Israel and the construction and maintenance of an enemy. 
National security concerns and the strong push to consolidate state-making projects 
have taken priority over cooperation (Luciani 1990). The Arab regional system has 
been defined on the basis of national security concerns. The end of the Cold War 
saw a marked decline in common Arab security perception (Barnett 2002), which 
has been further emphasized since 2003 by the Iraq war (Bilgin 2005). More relevant 
regional institutional organizations have been formed on sub-regional levels, such as 
the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).  
When the Declaration of Principles between Israel and the Palestine Liberation 
Organization (PLO) was signed in September 1993, hopes were raised for change 
towards closer cooperation in the Middle East (Peres 1993; Fischer 1993; Lindholm 
Schulz and Schulz 2001). As the Palestinian-Israeli conflict drifted away from the 
centre of the Middle East regional security complex, the time was considered right to 
build a regional structure built on shared interest as well as comparative advantage. 
Regionalization gradually came to be seen as an embryonic, but developing, 
process. Interregional initiatives and schemes in the form of EU-initiated programs 
also emerged.  
New ‘regionalist discourses’ included Israel as a partner to the Arab states. The 
‘New Middle East’ was one of the grand images of this time, illustrated by the US-
sponsored MENA concept (Middle East and North Africa). The multilateral peace 
talks on environment, water, arms control, refugees and regional development were 
components of these schemes (Peters 1996). The summits on economic 
development in particular attracted a great deal of attention.  
The key issue in all of this was whether Israel would become a more integrated 
member of the Middle East; in other words, whether the Arab regional system would 
transform into a Middle Eastern one. Aside from the political issues surrounding this 
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discourse, there were also different economic motives and interests. For many Arab 
parties, the incentive for such a transformation would be to attract foreign capital 
and investment, rather than to promote a free trade area. A Middle East Free Trade 
Area was seen as a road to Israeli hegemony (Abdel-Fadil 1997: 130). The inclusion of 
Israel in the region, involving a shift towards a ‘Middle Eastern’ definition of the 
region, away from a solely ‘Arab’ identity, would, according to this perspective, 
threaten the ‘Arabness’ of the Arab world. From this point of view, the peace 
process represented ‘fragmentation’ rather than ‘integration’. 
According to this perspective, ‘normalization’ of relations should be a result of 
the peace process and should not precede final peace agreements. A contesting 
vision and definition of the Middle East would define the region as “the Arab Middle 
East” (Ibrahim 1996). Indeed, a return to the Arab regional system was advocated 
from the mid-1990s. Skeptics on the Israeli side argued that there was much less for 
Israel in the “regional integration paradigm” than conventionally argued (Korany 
1997: 138). As relations between Palestinians and Israelis deteriorated from 1996,1 the 
enthusiasm for regional schemes also declined and the multilateral talks in effect 
ceased functioning. The halted multilateral talks were planned to resume in 2000, but 
this did not materialize; instead, the Arab economic boycott of Israel was reinstated 
from 1998.  
Bilgin (2005: 113) observed: “the origins of regions have had their roots in 
security thinking and practices of their inventors”. He is of the opinion that there are 
four major representations of the region: the “Middle East”, the “Arab Regional 
System”, the “Euro-Med Region” and the “Muslim Middle East” (ibid.).  
 
The EU and the Middle East 
 
Europe has since the 1950s taken a backseat role towards the Middle East in terms of 
security and conflict management, compared to the US. The EU remains an 
important player in Middle Eastern matters mainly in the realm of trade and 
development assistance; in terms of economic aspects, the EU is far more prominent 
than the US. More than 50 per cent of Middle East trade is with the EU. For the 
southern Mediterranean countries, the EU is a particularly important market. The 
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and Benyamin Netanyahu won the Prime Ministerial elections of May 1996. The Likud-led 
government was far less empathetic towards the Palestinian Authority, and the peace 
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Union is also the largest direct foreign investor and the largest provider of financial 
assistance to the region (European Commission 2005: 1); the Palestinian Authority 
(PA) is the primary recipient of this assistance. Although the Middle East is less 
significant for the EU’s trade (only about two percent of imports and three per cent 
of exports, respectively), the Gulf region is an important provider of energy (ibid.). 
Thus, the high profile of the EU in economic and financial terms is not matched by its 
low-key role in terms of conflict management; however, recent EU initiatives can be 
seen as attempts to strengthen its role in the Middle East.  
The EU has never succeeded in securing an official key role as a broker in the 
Palestinian-Israeli conflict, although individual EU states have clearly attempted to 
facilitate negotiations and to influence the actors in certain directions. It was Norway 
that in the 1990s played a crucial strategic role in the negotiations, rather than the EU 
or a member state. The reasons behind this apparent lack of EU initiatives include the 
fragmented nature of the EU’s policy towards the Middle East region, the lack of EU 
military capacity compared to the US, the strong ties between Israel and the US, and 
Israel’s lack of interest in the EU as a broker (Biscop 2003).  
 
Evolution of EU-Middle East Relations 
The Palestinian-Israeli and Arab-Israeli conflicts are the security issues that have 
received the longest historical attention from the EU; from the early 1970s, following 
the Yom Kippur war, the Arab-Israeli conflict was brought into the framework of 
European Political Cooperation. The position of the then six member states was that 
UN Resolutions 242 and 338 should be implemented; they emphasized the 
‘legitimate rights’ of the Palestinians.  
Through the Euro-Arab Dialogue – an initiative that stemmed from the oil crisis 
– diverging European positions were gradually brought closer. Throughout the 1970s, 
the Europeans maintained a relatively clear position, implying that the Palestinians 
had the right to a national identity and that there was a need for a Palestinian 
‘homeland’. The right of the Palestinians to a homeland, coupled with Israel’s right to 
exist within secure borders, have since been cornerstones of EU policy. However, this 
consistent position has not matured into a coherent position; diversified sympathies in 
the conflict have to some extent hindered a coherent Middle East policy (Smith 2004: 
116). European policymaking towards the Middle East is still largely formed through 
bilateral policies by individual member states and through internal skirmishes, and in 
this way, individual state politics have superseded a united European front.  
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The role of Germany has been complicated, given the historical implications 
of World War II and the Holocaust. The UK, although not always taking identical 
positions as the US, favors American negotiation and involvement. French political 
involvement in the region is colored by its own historical record and colonial past, 
implying closer relations with Syria, Lebanon and Iraq. Thus, France has advocated a 
more independent European policy. The southern European states – Italy, Greece 
and Spain – tend to sympathize with the Palestinians and Arabs, while the 
Scandinavian countries have favored mediation and negotiation based on a more 
neutral stand. The eastward expansion of the EU will also inevitably have 
consequences for policymaking, since many of the new members favor positions 
closely aligned to the American view. EU policymaking is thus, by necessity, the result 
of internal negotiation.  
Since 2000 and the eruption of the second intifada, Israelis and Palestinians 
have been engulfed in a vicious cycle of violence. The intensity of this violent period 
has had far-reaching repercussions for the prospects of resumed negotiations 
between the parties. The EU has acted as broker, a role that was underlined in the 
Taba talks in January 2001, when Israelis and Palestinians moved closer to a common 
position. EU Special Envoy Miguel Moratinos was the only outsider present at the 
Taba talks, although he did not participate in the negotiations directly (Taba Nego-
tiations 2001). Moratinos produced what was to become known as the ‘Moratinos 
non-paper’ on the Taba negotiations (based on interviews with the negotiators).   
The EU is a member of the Quartet on the Middle East, consisting of the EU, the 
Russian Federation, the UN and the US. These actors were brought together in April 
2002, formulating a joint response to the escalation of violence in the region. The 
Quartet’s main achievement has been the formulation of the Roadmap for Peace 
(A Performance-Based Roadmap 2003), which was produced in the midst of the al-
Aqsa crisis. A core element of the roadmap concerns Palestinian reforms, where 
Security Sector Reform (SSR) constitutes an important role. The security performance 
in the Palestinian territories has been widely criticized, while the purpose of SSR is to 
maintain law and order. The EU, partly through its participation in the Quartet, has 
become involved in ‘hard security’ issues. It is externally supporting the SSR with the 
main attempt for the security institutions to play a larger, more effective and 
trustworthy role in protecting the Palestinian population. Although the Roadmap has 
lead to nowhere and the security situation has not improved, it contains the 
parameters that most outside actors believe the parties should ultimately return to. 
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EU-Palestinian relations reached a low point after the victory of Hamas in the 
Palestinian 2006 elections as a result of the international decision to boycott Hamas. 
The EU and the US froze development assistance contributions to the authority, but 
elaborated a mechanism through which to reach the Palestinian people with aid 
flows. Aid contributions and diplomatic activities and approaches resumed after a 
Palestinian coalition government was formed in early 2007. At this point, the 
Europeans embarked on frenzied activity, with several foreign ministers as well as 
Javier Solana, EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, 
visiting the region in attempts to revitalize the peace process. The year of 2006 (until 
today) was a time when the EU had a great chance for conducting effective reform 
in the peace process. However, the international boycott of Hamas did not have 
any effect of decreasing the local support of Hamas. Also, the continuing financial 
support by the EU to Fatah and the Palestinian Authority during the same period had 
the opposite effect of creating an even larger gap internally between the fractions 
(Tocci 2007).   
 
The EU’s Role in the Lebanon and Iraq Wars 
The role of the EU in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has also been affected by other 
conflicts in the region, such as the Lebanon war in the summer of 2006. During the 
Lebanon war, rifts between US and EU perspectives were in clear evidence, most 
clearly when US President Bush advocated Israel’s right to defend itself, while the EU 
countries, led most vocally by France, labeled Israeli actions “totally dispro-
portionate” (Euractiv 2006a). The EU did acknowledge Israel’s right to defend itself 
but urged that it must be proportional and with restraint vis-à-vis the civilians. Despite 
France’s president Jacques Chirac strongly urging a more accentuated role, the EU 
once again failed to act coherently. After the crisis, however, the EU was concerned 
that the Lebanon war was a threat to peace and security in the region. As a result, 
the EU proclaims, in the ‘Lebanon Country Strategy paper of 2007-2013’, security to 
be of highest concern in Lebanon and neighboring countries after the war of 2006 
(European Commission 2007). Moreover, the EU became involved in ‘hard security’ 
issues as a consequence of the 2006 war in Lebanon with its 7000 peacekeeping 
troops, mainly Italians and French. The EU’s post-war center-stage role in Lebanon 
further led directly to the EU adopting a stronger voice in the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict. Even if a stronger military role clearly facilitates a more accentuated 
position in conflict management, the EU’s military credibility did not increase after 
  10 BRIGG Paper 1/2010 
the Lebanon war of 2006. However, the EU tried to push for a return to diplomacy 
and negotiations between all parts after the war. In September 2006, the EU’s foreign 
policy chief, Javier Solana, pushed for a two-state solution based on 1967 ‘borders’ 
(Euractiv 2006b).  
The EU has also played a muted role in Iraq. This may be traced, in part, to the 
early 1990s, when, during the first Gulf War, the EU appeared fragmented as an 
actor, without a coherent vision, policy or strategy, despite the fact that this war took 
place with the sanction of the UN Security Council. The American-led invasion of Iraq 
in 2003 revealed the ruptures within EU policy. Whereas the UK sided with the US, and 
has been continuously committed to the US strategy, France and Germany were 
vehemently opposed to a military attack on Iraq. France and Germany, along with 
some others, such as Sweden, insisted on a leading role for the UN in formulating and 
implementing the strategy regarding Iraq.  
EU member states that have committed troops in Iraq include the UK, Italy, 
Denmark, Poland and the Netherlands. But since the military strategies of EU member 
states’ involvement in Iraq vary significantly, the ruptures of the EU increase even 
more and many Middle Eastern countries continue to question the credibility of the 
EU’s military strategy (Schulz 2009). Throughout the US involvement in Iraq, the 
European policy has been to “transfer genuine sovereignty, including all security 
issues, to the new Iraqi government and put the UN in charge of helping the Iraqis 
define their own political future” (Everts 2004: 667). The 2004 Commission 
Communication ‘The EU and Iraq: A Framework for Engagement’ places the 
emphasis on “rehabilitation and reconstruction” (European Commission 2004). The 
eventual EU role in Iraq focused on providing assistance to the 2005 elections, 
assisting the transition phase and providing humanitarian assistance. Given the 
ongoing violent fragmentation of Iraq, reconstruction appears a distant possibility. 
While Arab states are generally critical (or at least skeptical) of the US strategy in Iraq, 
the EU has not been able to provide an effective alternative role to that of the US 
(Bilgin 2005: 117). An example is the Greater Middle East Initiative (GMEI), which was 
launched at the G8 meeting in 2008 and rather promotes the cooperation of the G8 
members (including the US and the EU) than the cooperation of Arab states (Schulz 
2009).  
The EU’s future role and involvement in Iraq is directly linked to the post-Bush 
era and the Obama Administration’s plan for a military withdrawal in 2011. The US 
and EU withdrawal does not mean an end of conflict and problems in Iraq but will 
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most likely challenge the security of the country as such, the Middle East as well as 
Europe. In that sense the EU’s role in this new phase might be similar to its position 
after the Lebanon war: involvement in ‘hard security’ issues in form of sending troops 
under the UN umbrella. At the same time, some argue that there is little interest of the 
EU being involved in this new phase, as a proposal by the Swedish Foreign Minister 
Carl Bildt to appoint an EU Special Representative for Iraq was rejected.    
 
The Quest for the Euro-Med Region 
 
The representation of the Euro-Med Region has come into fashion in a more 
comprehensive way since the 1970s. The basis for this definition is the 
‘Mediterranean’. Of the Arab Middle East states, Egypt and Lebanon have 
historically been most predisposed to identify as Mediterranean. Ambitions to more 
clearly stake out a Euro-Med Region came to the fore during the 1970s and were 
based on the changing security perceptions of the European Community (Bilgin 
2005: 120). Another early initiative in this regard was the Western Mediterranean 
Forum, initiated by France. The official aim of the process was to transform relations 
between Europe and the Middle East/North Africa and to integrate the 
Mediterranean countries within a European framework. 
The most comprehensive initiative of interregional relations, thus far, has been 
the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), born in Barcelona in 1995. The EMP – or 
the ‘Barcelona process’ – was initiated in an optimistic climate during the heydays of 
the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. Its establishment was contingent on the peace 
process, but the peace process itself was seen as separate from the EMP. The 
Barcelona process brings together the EU member states and 12 Mediterranean non-
members (Biscop 2003). The process was preceded by the Conference for Security 
and Cooperation in the Mediterranean, launched by the Italian and Spanish 
governments in 1990. The Barcelona process could to some extent be seen as 
Europe’s attempt to enter the business of ‘region-making’, as a response to the 
position the US was taking in international relations; the EMP is a project of 
“constructing a Euro-Med region” (Bilgin 2005: 118).  
Both the American and the European initiatives have aimed at supporting the 
creation of regional institutions as a means to increase their own respective security. 
In the European approach lies an explicit view of multilateralism and “good 
neighborly relations” (Biscop 2003: 20) as the preferred means of conducting interna-
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tional relations. The EMP is based on a different notion of the Middle East, since it 
involves the countries connected to the Mediterranean (with some exceptions), but 
excludes the Gulf countries Iraq and Iran. The European definition of the Euro-Med 
Region is thus based on its security concerns and focuses on North Africa and the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict, whereas the US focus is oriented towards the East of the 
Middle East, with a strong emphasis on the Gulf region. The preferred US 
configuration links the Middle East with Central Asia and other countries in the region, 
such as Afghanistan and Pakistan. Divergent security concerns thus bring the EU and 
US to diverging regional definitions. This could be seen as a ‘division of labor’. 
However, it could be argued that the EU preference for a Mediterranean definition 
of the region is what explains its absence as an actor having any efficiency on the 
stage of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This conflict is firmly situated in the Mashreq 
region and contains few linkages to the Maghreb (although the PLO maintained its 
headquarters in Tunisia for a decade). 
European motives for closer engagement on a regional level are related to 
the fact that the Middle East is a geographically close neighbor (Biscop 2003). In 
early 2001 then Commissioner for External Relations Chris Patten stated: “The 
Mediterranean is our ‘near abroad’ on our Southern flank. Thus, it should enjoy a 
special place in our external relations” (Patten 2001). The Regional Strategy Paper for 
the EMP states (EMP 2002: 4): 
The Mediterranean region is of strategic importance to the European Union. A 
key external relations priority for the EU is thus to promote prosperity, 
democracy, stability and security in the Mediterranean basin. This not only 
because of the political, economic, administrative, ecological and social 
challenges the basin is faced with, but also in view of the recurrent 
conflicts/instability in this region on the EU’s southern flank.  
 
There are two primary reasons for involvement in the region revealed in such formal 
statements. Interregional relations are pursued to promote economic development 
in the region and to create peace and stability. Middle Eastern insecurity has 
become a security issue for an EU wanting to ensure stability at home. As the EU 
expands, and with discussions about Turkish membership also on the table, defining 
the borders of the EU and of securing its relations with neighbors that are anticipated 
to grow closer to the Union become incredibly important. 
The EMP was directed towards steering the new efforts towards regional 
cooperation and integrating the Middle East within the global system in a more 
‘European direction’ and towards competing with the US in modeling a regional 
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entity out of the Middle East. The EMP is based on much the same notions as the EU 
itself. The EU here perceives of itself as a role model: economic cooperation and 
development as a prerequisite for peace. As Rüland (2002: 8) argues: 
Fostering ‘regionalism through interregionalism’ […] may be intended or 
unintended […] In the case of the EU, which is deliberately pursuing the role of 
an ‘external federator’, such a policy has a rationalizing effect on its own 
external relations because it enables Brussels to negotiate policy frameworks 
w i t h  e n t i r e  g r o u p s  o f  c o u n t r i e s  w h e r e  p r e v i o u s l y  i t  h a d  t o  d e a l  w i t h  t h e m  
individually.  
 
To foster interregional relations is thus a way to construct or establish a region in order 
to create a counterpart, a new actor, someone to relate to. The Barcelona Declara-
tion (1995) established a three-tiered partnership: a Political and Security Partnership, 
an Economic and Financial Partnership and a Social and Cultural Partnership. The 
Economic and Financial Partnership has been based on a Euro-Mediterranean free 
trade area, which is to be established by 2010.   
 
Conflict and Security 
“Economic integration and political dialogue are means through which to foster 
security” (Christiansen, Petito and Tonra 2000: 405). One of the EU’s strategic 
objectives is to extend the ‘zone of security around Europe’. An insecure neighbor is 
seen as a potentially destabilizing factor. The Barcelona process could therefore be 
seen as a comprehensive security approach, linking a lack of development in the 
Middle Eastern region to security concerns (Malmvig 2004). EU priority has focused on 
illegal immigration, organized crime and terrorism, at the expense of the security 
concerns of the Middle East (Malmvig 2004: 5). EU documents discursively argue for 
cooperative security and common security concerns, leaving unspecified what this 
would mean in practice and how the process would alleviate insecurities in the 
region. 
The Political and Security Partnership officially includes enhancement of 
stability, fostering of democratic institutions, preventive diplomacy, confidence- and 
security-building measures and joint efforts against transnational threats, such as 
terrorism. Peace and stability are to be established through the “promotion of 
common values and better understanding; conflict prevention, crisis management 
and post-conflict rehabilitation; the fight against terrorism, organized crime and drug 
trafficking; promotion of disarmament and arms control” and promoting confidence-
building (EMP 2002: 9). Discussions about confidence-building measures have also 
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evolved outside of the EMP framework as a way to create a similar structure to the 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) for the Middle East 
(Wohlfeld and Abela 2000). Confidence-building is, however, controversial in the 
Arab world, as Arab states tend to see confidence-building as contingent on the 
implementation of international law (Biscop 2003: 54). 
The Security Partnership aims to adopt a Euro-Mediterranean Charter for 
Peace and Stability, envisaged at the 1999 meeting in Stuttgart, where guidelines for 
this process were discussed (Calleya 2005: 3). Such a Charter would promote 
comprehensive security, but would at the same time eschew interference in ongoing 
conflicts. Discussions were also held over crisis management and post-conflict 
reconstruction, representing a step in the direction of enhanced cooperation. Here, 
confidence-building measures were acknowledged as difficult (Biscop 2003: 43). The 
2000 meeting in Marseille was to a large extent paralyzed by the outbreak of 
violence in Israel and in the Palestinian-administered areas. At the 2002 Valencia 
meeting, further steps were taken to enhance the dialogue on politics and security, 
such as the inclusion of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) on the 
dialogue’s agenda (ibid.: 50). European security concerns are also entering other 
arenas of cooperation, a process that has accelerated since 11 September 2001.  
Although the Middle East does not constitute a direct threat towards the EU or 
European countries, the Middle East as the ‘Other’ is often characterized in Western 
discourse as a source of threat and insecurity (Pace 2004: 293), in the form of illegal 
migration, drug trafficking and weapons of mass destruction; and as the home of 
Islamism and enmity to the West and, at the utmost extreme, terrorism. So 
constructions and perceptions of the ‘Other’, and thus the claims for a need of an 
intercivilizational dialogue, are indeed securitized or based in threat perceptions and 
security discourses. This discursive construction dates back to colonial days and 
‘Orientalist’ discursive practices. 
The portrayed instability and chaos in the Mediterranean is perceived as a 
source of insecurity for Europe. The hierarchical division that the EU has created with 
reference to its southern partners always portrays the European partner as superior 
and the Mediterranean partner as inferior. Thus, security discourses separate the 
alleged (assumed) victim of insecurity – Europe – and the cause of insecurity – the 
Mediterranean (Pace 2004).  
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Terrorism 
Global terror has rapidly entered European threat perceptions, as emphasized by 
the attacks in Madrid and London. The terror attacks in the midst of European 
capitals have underlined both the sense of vulnerability of the EU and the core role 
of the Middle East in EU security.  
Both the 2001 meeting in Brussels and the 2002 meeting in Valencia placed 
particular emphasis on the issue of terrorism, but also on the need to foster a 
“dialogue of cultures and civilizations” (Calleya 2005: 58). From the perspective of 
Arab counterparts, EU member states place too much emphasis on terrorism and 
security issues, at the expense of socioeconomic development (Biscop 2003; Attina 
2004). From the Arab states’ perspective, terrorism is more of a security concern for 
Arab countries than it is for the EU (Biscop 2003: 48). At the 2005 summit in Barcelona 
– the 10th anniversary of the EMP – most Arab states sent only low-level officials, 
indicating the skepticism in the Arab world towards the process. To some Arab 
observers the EMP is simply another Western strategy in the pursuit of hegemony and 
control of the Arab world (Habeeb 2002). Nevertheless, the summit concluded with a 
joint code of conduct, condemning all forms of terrorism (EMP 2005):  
To enhance the security of all citizens, particularly through more effective 
counter-terrorism policies and deeper co-operation to dismantle all terrorist 
activities, to protect potential targets, to manage the consequences of 
attacks, and to implement the Code of Conduct on Countering Terrorism they 
have agreed today. To condemn terrorism, wherever it is committed, without 
qualification and rejects all attempts to associate any religion or culture with 
terrorism.  
 
The statement condemned terrorism and simultaneously declared that no religion or 
culture should be associated with terrorism. It appears that the declaration to “act 
jointly against racism, xenophobia and intolerance, stressing respect for all religions, 
rejecting extremist views which attempt to divide us and incite violence and hatred, 
and joining together to promote common understanding” (ibid.) could be 
interpreted as the EU’s contribution, whereas the Middle Eastern states accepted the 
wordings on terrorism quoted above.  
 
Migration as Security 
Migration has, through a series of accords and agreements, been increasingly 
securitized (Salamé 1998: 38). Initially, migration was treated within the cultural and 
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social basket, but after 11 September 2001 migration issues and terrorism have 
become increasingly linked in various polices.  
For the EU, illegal migration should be halted, whereas the perspective of 
Middle Eastern countries is that migration is caused by structural inequalities and 
requires that EU countries adopt more open migration policies and liberal asylum 
practices. Further, the Middle Eastern partners see migration as a means of 
alleviating pressure on domestic labor markets and as a way of generating 
remittances (Testas 2001: 68). It is clear why interests diverge. 
Migration and the movement of people are also intrinsic aspects of 
globalization and a sphere of policymaking where Europe’s borders are indeed 
clearly ‘fuzzy’ (Christiansen, Petito and Tonra 2000). The desperation of migration and 
the difficulties involved in getting to Europe are obvious in the many incidents of 
migrants perishing on the waves of the Mediterranean in desperate attempts to 
reach European shores. Sad incidents such as these are of great concern to the EU, 
both for their humanitarian consequences, but also in producing images of a Europe 
highly protected against global movements of people.  
The riots in the suburbs of France in 2005 underlined the strategic role that 
migration plays, particularly in relations between the EU and North Africa. Migrants 
from the Middle East (North Africa as well as Turkey) constitute a large and excluded 
minority in European countries whose integration policies have clearly failed. 
Some of the largest communities of legal migrants present in the EU come 
from the Mediterranean partners. The perception of these migrants of their situation 
has a significant effect on the political relationship: cooperation should therefore aim 
to reduce the causes of tension. On the other hand, geographical proximity and the 
large prosperity gap between the EU and the partners gives rise to flows of illegal 
migration and trafficking in human beings; costly in terms both of human misery and 
social repercussions, which the EU and the partners have a joint interest in 
addressing. Finally, concerns about the treatment of visa applicants by EU authorities 
also need to be addressed (European Commission 2002). 
The EU’s cooperation with some Mediterranean partners (for example 
Morocco) around curbing illegal migration has led to concern and criticism from 
human rights organizations (Human Rights Watch 2006). In fact, such cooperation is 
a new form of security subcontracting, in which the EU delegates to its southern 
partners the responsibility for stopping potential illegal migration.  
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In the ‘Regional Strategy Paper 2002-2006’, terrorism and migration are 
treated under the same heading: “Enhancing the rule of law, human rights and, 
good governance: Justice and home affairs”; indicative of the fact that the EU 
perceives migrants and migration as being potential security threats (European 
Commission 2002). The fact that, for example, some of the perpetrators of the bomb 
attacks in London in the summer of 2005 were young UK citizens whose parents were 
migrants of Pakistani origin has amplified for the EU the increased difficulties in 
distinguishing between ‘inside’ and ‘outside’. Globalization of movement means that 
it is no longer meaningful to secure a border from outside threat.  
The spheres of justice and home or domestic affairs are becoming 
increasingly infiltrated by a new security thinking, as in the US (although in different 
degrees and ways), implying the implementation of new policies as well as 
techniques of control and surveillance of citizens and, in particular, of immigrants. 
New anti-terror legislation is among the instruments used by EU countries in their 
ambitions of fighting terrorism (Dalgaard-Nielsen 2004: 166). These policies and 
procedures may, however, well obstruct efforts towards democratization and the 
introduction of liberal politics (Gillespie 2003: 34). The globalization of both security 
and threats means, in one sense, that threats are moving closer to states. No longer 
can states ‘secure’ themselves through defending their borders; globalization means 
that the enemy is within as well as on the outside – hence the perceived need for the 
utilization of institutions to handle domestic affairs in security-related goals. The global 
security agenda post-September 11 has meant that interregional relations and 
institutions are interpreted as a means of dealing with the threat of terrorism (Rüland 
2002: 4).  
 
The Middle East Peace Process  
As has been emphasized, the EU’s conflict management role in the Palestinian–Israeli 
conflict has historically been understated. The Palestinian–Israeli conflict is also 
excluded from the EMP process, despite the fact that the Middle East Peace Process 
and the EMP were contemporaneous, and despite the magnitude of the issue within 
the region and in the context of interregional relations. The EMP is highly dependent 
on the peace process, as the latter has an immediate effect upon all parts of the 
EMP. When relations deteriorate, the climate is also immediately sharpened within 
the EMP discussions (Biscop 2003: 71). However, the growing economic role of the EU 
has gradually implied more leverage on issues related to peace and conflict, and 
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the EU is increasingly coordinating as a single actor, which is evident in the 
formulation of visions and policies for the Middle East (Hollis 1997). That the EU is one 
of the most prominent financial contributors to the Palestinian Authority has seen the 
EU become increasingly eager to contribute to dialogue in the peace process. 
However, the escalation of the violence that broke out in late September 2000 
caused such uncertainty and unease that the parties retreated, and no agreement 
was signed. The EU’s policy towards the Middle East Peace Process still depends on 
particular presidencies and their respective stances. In terms of policy position, the 
EU is clear in that a two-state solution is the aim and that international law is to be the 
basis for any agreement. Institution-building is to be the cornerstone of a successful 
resolution of the conflict.  
As Calleya (2005: 54) points out, the Barcelona process has failed to influence 
the Middle East Peace Process and has instead become hostage to it. However, it 
should also be emphasized that the EMP is one of the few initiatives that includes 
both Syria and Israel that has survived the current impasse in the peace process. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The EMP has not been a success in establishing an interregional security regime 
(Biscop 2003; Youngs and Gillespie 2002), and although a framework for interregional 
cooperation exists, it remains fragile. Interests diverge both within the two regions 
and between them. It may be argued that the Euro-Med definition of the Middle 
East remains elusive and without strong advocates in the Arab Middle East. It could 
also be emphasized that although this may be true, the ideas associated with the 
EMP framework have not met with any significant opposition (Bilgin 2005). The Euro-
Med definition is thus a potential alternative vision to the American-based regional 
representation and might serve the function of ‘balancing’ the dominant US position. 
The weakness of the Euro-Med construction, however, remains its strong security 
underpinnings, aggravating interregional asymmetries (Bilgin 2005). Thus, the US 
‘Middle Easternism’ is based on security militarily defined, whereas the European 
security concerns are broader and bring in ‘softer’ issues. EU security perceptions are 
based on European points of reference and fail to acknowledge the security 
concerns of their Arab partners. 
Fundamental security concerns are terrorism and migration and the 
perceived linkage between the two. Although the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is also at 
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the heart of European security interests, the EU has failed to play an active role in the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict in that sense. US interests in the region and the US and Israel 
accusing the EU of being pro-Palestinian are a hindrance to EU activities, at least in 
the sense of playing a practical visible role in the conflict. But on the other hand, as 
the US has virtually neglected the Palestinian needs, the EU plays a very important 
role in recognizing these needs, and it is in a position to push for a more democratic 
Palestinian state. The EU has also played an important role as a legitimizer of the PLO. 
Further, the mere fact that most funds to the PA stems from the EU has in itself 
created the PLO/PA as a viable Palestinian representative vis-à-vis Israel in the overall 
conflict. 
This implies that, for all the rhetoric proclaiming ‘partnership’, relations are 
strongly asymmetrical. Furthermore, the interregional relationship between the EU 
and the Middle East is hostage to the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians, and 
the deterioration of relations between Israelis and Palestinians also means that 
prospects for deeper regional and interregional relations are diminished. Interregion-
alism remains nascent, as the EMP still lacks institutional strength as well as a common 
agenda. The EU’s initiatives have thus far been defined more by the agenda of the 
EU than by the needs of counterparts. Despite the rhetoric, the EMP is not an 
institution of partnership based on equal relations. The EU’s interregional ambitions 
are to be seen as a means to balance US power and to create a greater scope for 
European action.  
Finally, globalization has meant more porous borders, so that the movement 
of peoples from other regions – such as the Middle East – to Europe is one of the 
greatest security concerns of European countries. Also, violence has become 
globalized, in the form of networks of informal violence and terrorism, providing a 
new threat to Europe. The Middle East Peace Process is also a significant security 
concern of the EU, in particular because of the ways in which this conflict has an 
impact upon Euro-Mediterranean relations. Despite all this, there is as yet no conflict 
resolution mechanism within the EMP. 
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